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THE PUBLIC BELIEVES PREDISPUTE
BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE UNJUST:
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTE-SYSTEM
DESIGN IN THE TIME OF VANISHING TRIALS
Victor D. Quintanilla* & Alexander B. Avtgis**
INTRODUCTION
One troubling cause of the decline in civil trials is the growing ubiquity of
predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.1 Over the past
decade, two interacting patterns have come to encourage transactional
attorneys to engage in zealous advocacy when crafting such clauses. First,
recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence broadly defers and delegates
authority to those who create binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts
with little oversight.2 Second, members of the public rarely read or
understand these clauses buried in boilerplate language.3
These clauses displace the legal backdrop of fair, legitimate, and just
public legal institutions with the dispute-system procedure most preferred by
those who draft and design adhesion contracts.4 Therefore, norms of zealous
* J.D., 2004, Georgetown University Law Center. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University, Maurer School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law, Indiana University, Department
of Psychological and Brain Sciences. For their generous insights and feedback, I thank Judith
Resnik, Nancy Welsh, Michael Frisby, and participants of the Stein Center for Law and Ethic’s
colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham
University School of Law. For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’
Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations,
Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017).
** J.D./M.P.A. candidate, 2017, Maurer School of Law and School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University.
1. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052, 3074–75 (2015); Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United
States District Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 752 (2010) (“As trials have declined, private
arbitrations have grown exponentially. . . . [A]lternative dispute resolution (ADR) has gained
a life of its own.”).
2. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in the Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2808–11 (2015).
3. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?: Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014); Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L.
Rustad, Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of Social Media Arbitration Clauses,
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341, 380–82 (2014).
4. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV
1631, 1649 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural
Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 188 (2012).
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advocacy may collide with a wider and more virtuous ethic that considers
third parties and the public’s desire for a fair, legitimate, and just civil justice
system.5
Before turning to the dialectic between these two ethical principles, we
report a psychological experiment conducted with the American public.6 The
study randomly assigned members of the public into conditions that varied
the amount they learned about the procedure (for example, a legal definition,
an example clause, a New York Times article) and asked them to rate the
fairness and justice of binding arbitration. The experiment reveals that the
more the public learns about predispute binding arbitration clauses, the more
they believe this dispute-resolution procedure is unjust and illegitimate. Yet,
the vast majority of participants mistakenly believed that they had never
agreed to a binding arbitration clause.
Drawing on these findings, we discuss the pressing need for a wider ethic
that applies to transactional attorneys who design binding arbitration clauses
within adhesion contracts. We also draw lessons from behavioral legal ethics
and social psychology. These lessons reveal that this wider ethic may be
endangered by the situational influences that currently operate within law
firms (and in-house) due to these two intersecting patterns. We discuss ways
of altering the regulatory environment to encourage the wider ethic to
flourish.
I. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON
PREDISPUTE BINDING CONSUMER ARBITRATION
While the number of empirical legal studies on predispute binding
consumer arbitration has increased since AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion7
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,8 this body of
literature has been eclipsed by the rise in the use of binding arbitration clauses
in adhesion contracts9 and the power of these clauses as reinforced by the
post-Concepcion, post-Italian Colors legal regime.10

5. See generally David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839 (1999);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design?: And
What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy
and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006).
6. The authors conducted this survey, which is referenced repeatedly throughout this
Article as Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, Survey on Binding Arbitration (Aug.
2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Survey].
7. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
8. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
9. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT § 1028(a) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-studyreport-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BPH-XN97]; Myriam Gilles, Killing Them
with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2013).
10. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 60 (2014).
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Legal scholars have empirically examined several important issues that
relate to whether consumers meaningfully consent to predispute binding
consumer arbitration. For example, a body of literature examines consumers’
general understanding of standard-form contracts and included contract
terms. This research reveals both that consumers rarely read the fine print in
adhesion contracts,11 and even in the rare instances when they do, they
seldom understand the meaning and effect of binding arbitration clauses.12
Recent empirical legal studies that explore predispute binding arbitration
clauses, and particularly those clauses with class waivers, focus on the
growing prevalence of these clauses themselves13 or the content, legal
implications, or varying effects that such clauses have for consumers and
employees.14 These studies find that predispute binding consumer arbitration
clauses and class action waivers are ubiquitous and that their use is rising.15
Furthermore, these studies reveal that members of the public, as one-shot
players, often fare poorly in binding arbitration.16 Not surprisingly, the mere
existence of a predispute binding consumer arbitration clause or class action
waiver reduces the likelihood of securing counsel.17
These lines of inquiry surely deepen our knowledge of the extent to which
consumers and employees truly consent to these terms and the effect of this
legal backdrop, while leaving open the question of what an ordinary member
of the public thinks and feels about these clauses after learning their effect.
In short, a gap exists in the body of empirical work.18

11. See, e.g., Thomas J. Maronick, Do Consumers Read Terms of Service Agreements
When Installing Software?: A Two-Study Empirical Analysis, 4 INT’L J. BUS. & SOC. RES. 137,
144 (2014); Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting
Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 886–87 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Bakos et al., supra note 3, at 2; Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts”
with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of
Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 81 (2015) (demonstrating a “profound lack of
understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements”); Debra P. Stark &
Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer
Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 671–73 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses
in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008).
14. For example, David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher examine an extensive
dataset of American Arbitration Association complaints as well as report filing rates,
outcomes, damages, costs, and case lengths. See Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note
10, at 91–102.
15. See generally Gilles, supra note 9; Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of
Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643 (2012).
16. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 10, at 57.
17. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309, 1334 (2015) (“[G]iven the economics of how plaintiff-side employment attorneys are
compensated, when employers impose mandatory arbitration clauses they make it more
difficult for employees to secure legal representation.”).
18. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need
to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (2009).
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Prior studies underscore that the public fails to grasp what these terms in
adhesion contracts mean when seeking goods, services, credit, or
employment. Here, we investigate what the public thinks and feels about
binding consumer arbitration after learning about the actual meaning and
significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.
Our study seeks to simulate the critical moment in which a member of the
public learns from a legal professional, after his or her dispute has arisen, that
the dispute is bound by a predispute binding arbitration clause. We will also
describe the implications of this experience on the ethics of dispute-system
design in our general discussion.
II. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDY: HOW DOES LEARNING ABOUT
PREDISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSES AFFECT
THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTION OF THE DISPUTE PROCEDURE?
Our empirical legal study examined the extent to which learning about
predispute binding arbitration clauses affects the way in which ordinary
members of the public view the dispute procedure. We conducted a
psychological experiment that investigated the hypothesis that the more that
ordinary members of the American public learn about the meaning and
significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses, the more they think the
practice is unfair and unjust. We hypothesized that, relative to providing
them (1) no information (and simply testing their lay beliefs); (2) a legal
definition of binding arbitration; or (3) a sample predispute binding
arbitration clause, after learning about the meaning of predispute binding
arbitration clauses in a New York Times article reporting how ordinary
Americans are affected by the dispute-resolution procedure, their beliefs
about the justice and fairness of binding consumer arbitration would
diminish.
A. Method: Design and Participants
Our study employed a single-factor, between-subjects design consisting of
four conditions that cumulatively increased exposure to information: (1) a
“no information” condition, (2) a “legal definition of binding arbitration”
condition, (3) a “legal definition of binding arbitration and an example
predispute binding arbitration clause” condition, and (4) a “legal definition
of binding arbitration, an example predispute binding arbitration clause, and
a New York Times article” condition. We recruited 400 participants (N = 400)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon Mechanical Turk is widely
employed within the behavioral and social sciences as a platform to recruit
nationally representative samples of the American public.19 Of the total
19. See generally Krista Casler et al., Separate but Equal?: A Comparison of Participants
and Data Gathered via Amazon’s MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral
Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2156, 2156–60 (2013); John J. Horton et al., The Online
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399
(2011); Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010). Participants received a $1.00 payment as
compensation for participation in our study.
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recruited, seventy-one participants failed the study’s manipulation check
(described below) and were excluded from analyses. Thus, the final sample
consisted of 329 adults who passed the study’s manipulation check. This
sample included 190 males (57.8 percent) and 139 females (42.2 percent) and
comprised the following self-reported racial/ethnic groups: 75.4 percent
Caucasian/white, 8.5 percent Asian/Asian American, 5.8 percent African
American/black, 7.3 percent Hispanic, 0.3 percent Native American and 2.7
percent other. Geographically, participants resided in thirty-nine states. The
majority of participants either graduated from a four-year college/university
(40.7 percent) or had studied at such a college/university (13.4 percent). The
average age of the sample of the American public was 36.19 years
(M = 36.19, SD = 12.23).
B. Procedure
After reading an introduction for the research study, participants gave their
informed consent to participate in an online survey about dispute-resolution
procedures. Participants were then randomly assigned by the Qualtrics
platform to one of the following four conditions.
In the “no information” condition, participants read this prompt: “In this
survey, you will be asked for your opinions about two procedures for
resolving disputes that consumers bring against financial companies, such as
credit card issuers, banks, private student loan companies, and mobile
wireless companies. These two procedures are (1) binding arbitration and (2)
trial.” After reading this introductory statement, the participants proceeded
to the next page of the survey where they rated the dependent measures
described below.
In the “legal definition of binding arbitration” condition, participants read
the introductory statement and then immediately proceeded to the next page
of the survey, which stated:
Black’s Law Dictionary defines arbitration as follows: arbitration n. A
dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one or
more neutral third parties to make a final and binding decision resolving
the dispute. The parties to the dispute may choose a third party directly by
mutual agreement, or indirectly, such as by agreeing to have an arbitration
organization select the third party.—Also termed (redundantly) binding
arbitration—arbitrate, vb.—arbitral, adj.20

In the “example binding arbitration clause” condition, participants read the
introductory statement and the legal definition of binding arbitration, and
they were then provided an example binding arbitration clause, which stated:
Applicable Law; Arbitration. This website is arranged, sponsored, and
managed in the state of Washington, USA. The laws of the state of
Washington govern this Agreement and all of its terms and conditions,
without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of laws. You agree that
any action at law or in equity arising out of or relating to these terms and
conditions shall be submitted to confidential arbitration in Seattle,
20. This quote is drawn from Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Washington, except that, to the extent you have in any manner violated or
threatened to violate our intellectual property rights, we may seek
injunctive or other appropriate relief in any state or federal court in the state
of Washington, and you consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such
courts. Arbitration under this agreement shall be conducted under the rules
then prevailing of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator’s
award shall be binding and may be entered as a judgment in any court of
competent jurisdiction. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law,
no arbitration under this Agreement shall be joined to an arbitration
involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether through class
arbitration proceedings or otherwise.

Unbeknownst to the participants, this was virtually the same clause
governing their employment as workers of Amazon Mechanical Turk.
In the “New York Times article” condition, participants read the
introductory statement, the legal definition of binding arbitration, the
example binding arbitration clause, and a New York Times article entitled
“Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice” by Jessica SilverGreenberg and Robert Gebeloff, dated October 31, 2015. This article was
the first in an important trilogy of articles reporting an investigation
conducted by the New York Times on how binding consumer arbitration
affects ordinary members of the American public. For most members of the
public, this article was their introduction to the real-world meaning and
significance of predispute binding consumer arbitration clauses. The article
begins with the statement:
On Page 5 of a credit card contract used by American Express, beneath
an explainer on interest rates and late fees, past the details about annual
membership, is a clause that most customers probably miss. If cardholders
have a problem with their account, American Express explains, the
company “may elect to resolve any claim by individual arbitration.”
....
Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for
a credit card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop online
without agreeing to private arbitration. The same applies to getting a job,
renting a car or placing a relative in a nursing home.21

After reading and learning the information in each of the conditions, they
turned to the dependent measures described in detail below. Participants
completed a manipulation check to ensure that they correctly understood the
information presented, also described below. Afterward, participants
21. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://
perma.cc/HZX7-K7F8]. Most scholars and readers regarded this news account as highlighting
the growing ubiquity of predispute binding arbitration clauses and the way in which these
clauses insulate entities from liability. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471–76
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s
Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 142. Some have
criticized the article, arguing that the greater problem is predispute binding arbitration clauses
that ban class-wide relief. See David B. Lipsky, The New York Times’ Attack on Arbitration,
22 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (2016).
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completed a short demographic questionnaire (about, for example, gender,
age, race, education, and residential state). They then indicated which of
several statements applied to them, such as, “I am a person who has signed a
binding arbitration clause.”22 Participants then indicated whether and how
certain they were that, “[b]y using Mturk, have you entered into a binding
arbitration clause with Amazon?”23 Finally, they were asked to “[p]lease
explain your response so that we can understand your answers.”24
C. Measures
This section describes the dependent measures that the participants
completed.
1. Familiarity
On a seven-point scale ranging from one (“not at all familiar”) to seven
(“very familiar”), we asked participants to rate for trial and binding
arbitration: “How familiar are you with the following procedures for
resolving disputes that consumers have with financial companies, such as
credit card issuers, banks, private student loan companies, and mobile
wireless companies?”25
2. Justice and Legitimacy Items
Participants were then asked to rate trial and binding arbitration on six
items that relate to perceived fairness, unfairness, justice, accuracy,
effectiveness, and legitimacy: “Using the scales provided, please rate trial
and binding arbitration as ways of resolving disputes that consumers bring
against financial companies, such as credit card companies, banks, private
student loan providers, and mobile wireless companies.”26 We asked
participants to rate trial and binding arbitration on each of these six items,
again, on a seven-point scale ranging from one (“not at all”) to seven
(“very”): how fair, unfair, just, accurate, effective, and legitimate are the
following procedures?27 As described below, these six measures were highly
correlated with feelings toward binding arbitration and converged on a single
underlying factor, referred to as an “anticipated experience of justice.”
3. Feelings Toward Trial and Binding Arbitration
A seven-point scale assessed how participants feel toward trial and binding
arbitration as ways of resolving disputes (very negative, negative, somewhat
negative, neutral, somewhat positive, positive, very positive).28
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Survey, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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4. Favorability Toward Binding Arbitration
Participants also rated how favorable or unfavorable they feel toward
binding arbitration (very unfavorable, unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable,
neutral, somewhat favorable, favorable, very favorable), and they were asked
to explain those feelings toward binding arbitration “so that we can
understand your impressions.”29
5. Manipulation Check
A manipulation-check item assessed whether participants correctly
recalled the information that they read about binding arbitration. Participants
were asked:
In today’s study, you were presented with and read, (1) Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of arbitration, (2) Black’s Law Dictionary’s
definition of arbitration AND an example arbitration clause, (3) Black’s
Law Dictionary’s definition of arbitration, and example arbitration clause,
AND a New York Times article on binding arbitration, or (4) None of the
above. I simply recorded my impressions of trial and binding arbitration.30

D. Results
This section describes the results of the survey and how we analyzed
them.
1. Measuring Results: The Analytic Strategy
Before turning to results, we describe our analytic strategy. First, an initial
analysis of variance (ANOVA) omnibus test examined whether there were
statistically significant differences between conditions for each disputeresolution procedure: trial and binding arbitration. Next, if the omnibus test
indicated that the conditions significantly differed, Tukey honest significant
difference (HSD) post hoc tests probed for differences between the
information conditions to specifically examine whether the New York Times
article condition was different from all other information conditions. All
means and standard deviations for each dependent variable (by label) are
reported in table 1 in the appendix.
2. Familiarity
An ANOVA revealed that participants’ prior familiarity with binding
arbitration did not statistically differ across information conditions,
F(3, 325) = 0.92, p = .431, ηp2 = .01.31 In addition, participants’ prior
familiarity with trial did not differ across information conditions,
F(3, 325) = 0.93, p = .427, ηp2 = .01. As such, the randomization of

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Table 1.
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participants with different levels of prior familiarity for these procedures
between conditions was successful.
3. Justice and Legitimacy Items
(i) Fairness. An ANOVA revealed that information had a significant
effect on perceptions of the fairness of binding consumer arbitration,
F(3, 325) = 21.07, p < .000, ηp2 = .16.32 Tukey tests explored potential
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other
information conditions. Results revealed that the New York Times article
condition (M = 3.27, SD = 1.58) differed from all other conditions: no
information condition (M = 3.99, SD = 1.36) (p = .011), definition condition
(M = 5.00, SD = 1.37) (p < .000), and sample clause condition (M = 4.57,
SD = 1.43) (p < .000).33 The more participants learned about the meaning
and significance of predispute binding consumer arbitration clauses, the more
their ratings of the fairness of binding arbitration decreased.
(ii) Legitimacy. An ANOVA revealed that information also had a
significant effect on perceptions of the legitimacy of binding consumer
arbitration, F(3, 325) = 19.05, p < .000, ηp2 = .15.34 Tukey tests explored
potential differences between the New York Times article condition and all
the other information conditions. Results again revealed that the New York
Times article condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.69) differed from all other
conditions: no information condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.66) (p < .000),
definition condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.49) (p < .000), and sample clause
condition (M = 5.02, SD = 1.58) (p < .000).35 As participants learned more
about how ordinary Americans are affected by predispute binding arbitration
clauses, their ratings of the legitimacy of the procedure decreased.
The pattern of results observed for “fairness” and “legitimacy” was
replicated across all seven justice and legitimacy dependent measures,
including the remaining measures of “unfairness,” “justness,” “accuracy,”
and “effectiveness.”36 In short, the more the public learns about how
predispute binding arbitration clauses operate, the more unfair and unjust
they find the dispute procedure.

32. See infra Table 1.
33. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1.
34. See infra Table 1.
35. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1.
36. See infra Table 2. Above, we report the influence of learning about predispute binding
arbitration clauses on attitudes toward binding arbitration. Here, we report the influence of
learning about predispute binding arbitration clauses on attitudes toward trial. Taken together,
the information read did not significantly affect perceptions of fairness of trial
F(3, 325) = 1.47, p = .224, ηp2 = .01 (MGrand = 5.28, SDGrand = 1.34), perceptions of the
unfairness of trial, F(3, 325) = 0.143, p = .934, ηp2 = .00 (MGrand = 2.84, SDGrand = 1.44),
perceptions of the accuracy of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.06, p = .105, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 4.93,
SDGrand = 1.30), or perceptions of the justness of trial, F(3, 325) = 1.44, p = .231, ηp2 = .01
(MGrand = 5.23, SDGrand = 1.38). The information read marginally affected perceptions of the
effectiveness of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.12, p = .098, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 5.14, SDGrand = 1.34), and
the legitimacy of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.41, p = .067, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 5.75, SDGrand = 1.31).
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4. Feelings Toward Trial and Binding Arbitration
An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had
a significant effect on feelings toward the dispute procedure,
F(3, 322) = 27.19, p < .000, ηp2 = .20.37 Tukey tests explored potential
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other
information conditions. Results revealed that the New York Times article
condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.53) differed from the no information condition
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.47) (p < .000), the definition condition (M = 4.74,
SD = 1.42) (p < .000), and the sample clause condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.62)
(p < .000).38 As compared to the other conditions, after participants read the
New York Times article depicting how ordinary Americans are affected by
the dispute-resolution procedure, they had greater negative feelings toward
binding arbitration. The information provided did not have a significant
effect on feelings toward trial, F(3, 325) = 1.61, p = .187, ηp2 = .02
(MGrand = 4.98, SDGrand = 1.39).
5. Favorability Toward Binding Arbitration
An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had
a significant effect on the favorability toward this dispute procedure,
F(3, 325) = 27.18, p < .000, ηp2 = .20.39 Tukey tests explored potential
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other
information conditions. Results revealed that the New York Times article
condition (M = 2.61, SD = 1.53) differed from all other conditions: no
information condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.61) (p < .000), definition condition
(M = 4.78, SD = 1.35) (p < .000), and sample clause condition (M = 4.35,
SD = 1.67) (p < .000).40 As compared to the other conditions, when
participants learned about how ordinary Americans are affected by binding
arbitration, they found the dispute-resolution procedure less favorable.

37.
38.
39.
40.

See infra Figure 1, Table 1.
For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1.

2017]

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTE SYSTEMS

2129

Favorability Toward Binding Arbitration

Figure 1: Categories in this figure and in table 1 in the appendix reflect
reading information and cumulate as follows: No information, Black’s
Law Dictionary definition, Sample clause from Amazon Mturk agreement,
and New York Times article. Means and 95% CI are represented.
7
6
5

No Information

4

Black's Law Dictionary
Definition

3

Sample Clause from
Amazon Agreement

2

New York Times Article

1
0

Learning About Binding Consumer Arbitration

6. Anticipated Experience of Justice
After establishing the interitem correlation of the justice and legitimacy
items, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis to test the extent to which
these measures form a single composite and load onto a single latent factor.
Ultimately, we concluded that these seven measures converged on a single
underlying factor—an anticipated experience of justice with binding
consumer arbitration. We then conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine
the influence of learning about binding arbitration on anticipated experiences
of justice.
To begin, table 3 in the appendix reveals the interitem correlation between
these dependent measures. As can be observed, the variables are highly
correlated, with all interitem Pearson’s R rising above .446. This indicates
that the psychological experiences reflected by these dependent measures are
highly correlated.
Next, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis, which revealed a
Cronbach’s α of .936. This evidences a high reliability that these items reflect
an underlying construct. Therefore, we conducted an exploratory factor
analysis, which revealed that all seven dependent measures are explained by
a single underlying factor. The cross-scenario solution yielded one
significant eigenvalue of 5.10 for all seven measures, respectively,
cumulatively explaining 72.79 percent of the total variation. The KMO
statistic was .935 with a significant Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001),
indicating the appropriateness of the factor analysis.
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An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had
a significant effect on anticipated experiences of justice, F(3, 325) = 28.46,
p < .000, ηp2 = .21.41 Tukey tests explored potential differences between the
New York Times article condition and all the other information conditions.
Results revealed that the New York Times article condition (M = 3.22,
SD = 1.29) differed from all other conditions: no information condition
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.20) (p = .001), definition condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.16)
(p < .000), and sample clause condition (M =4.61, SD = 1.27) (p < .000).42
As compared to the other conditions, when participants learned how ordinary
Americans are affected by binding arbitration, their anticipated experiences
of justice in this dispute-resolution procedure greatly diminished.
Figure 2: Categories reflect reading information presented and cumulate
as follows: No information, Black’s Law Dictionary definition, Sample
clause from Amazon Mturk agreement, and New York Times article.
Means and 95% CI are represented.

Anticipated Expereience of Justice

7
6
5

No Information

4

Black's Law Dictionary
Definition

3

Sample Clause from
Amazon Agreement

2

New York Times Article

1
0

Learning About Binding Consumer Arbitration

7. Beliefs the Public Holds About Whether They Have
Entered into Binding Arbitration Clauses
After responding to these measures, participants then completed a brief
demographic questionnaire, which asked them to “[p]lease mark any of the
following statements that apply to you.”43 The first category was, “I am a
person who has signed a binding arbitration clause,” and it was listed first

41. See infra Table 1, infra Figure 2.
42. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1.
43. Survey, supra note 6.

2017]

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTE SYSTEMS

2131

and quite conspicuously before several other categories.44 The list also
contained a “none of the above” option below these categories.
Troublingly, 71.4 percent (235 participants) marked “none of the above,”
and only 14.9 percent (49 participants) indicated that they have signed a
binding arbitration clause. These responses are patently incorrect for at least
two reasons. First, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s empirical
research reveals that binding arbitration clauses are ubiquitous and that tens
of millions of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are
subject to predispute arbitration clauses, including mobile wireless phones
(87.5 percent of contracts covering 99.9 percent of the market).
Figure 3: Beliefs that the public holds about whether they have signed
contracts with binding arbitration clauses. The vast majority of the
participants did not believe that they had signed a contract with a binding
arbitration clause.

Beliefs the Public Holds About
Signing Contracts with
Binding-Arbitration Clauses

14.90%
[Yes]: I am a person
who has signed a
binding arbitration
clause.

85.10%

[No]: I am not a person
who has signed a
binding arbitration
clause.

Second, by definition, all of these participants (100 percent) as workers on
Amazon Mechanical Turk’s online platform have entered into a predispute
binding arbitration clause with a class action waiver. Indeed, by registering
44. These additional categories were “I have legal training or experience,” “I am an
arbitrator,” “I own or run a business,” “I am a person who has a claim or dispute that involves
or involved a binding consumer arbitration clause,” “I am affiliated with a public interest
group,” “I am a person who has filed a claim in court,” “I am a person who has defended
myself against a claim in court,” and “None of the Above.” Id.

2132

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

for and using the site, all workers had agreed “to be bound by all terms and
conditions of this agreement,” which included virtually the precise predispute
binding arbitration clause used in the study.45
Finally, we asked participants, “By using MTurk, have you entered into a
binding arbitration clause with Amazon?”46 Most participants marked “no”
(66 percent, 217 participants); some participants marked “yes” (34 percent,
112 participants).47
Figure 4: Beliefs Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers hold about
whether they have entered into a binding arbitration clause with Amazon.

Beliefs AMT Workers
Hold About Having Entered into a
Binding-Arbitration Clause with Amazon

34.00%
66.00%

[Yes]: By using Mturk,
have you entered into a
binding arbitration
clause with Amazon?
[No]: By using Mturk,
have you entered into a
binding arbitration
clause with Amazon?

Importantly, we then followed up by asking them, “How certain are you of
your response?” on a zero (not at all certain) to 100 (very certain) scale.48
The median indicated uncertainty (Median = 40). We combined the
dichotomous scores with the continuous score to create a score for each
participant ranging from −100 (very certain that they did not enter into a
binding arbitration clause with AMT) to 100 (very certain that they entered
into binding arbitration clause with AMT). The mean score on this scale
45. See Amazon Mechanical Turk Participation Agreement, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK,
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse (last updated Dec. 2, 2014) [https://
perma.cc/2WG5-JKS4]. The only alteration to the clause was replacing “Amazon” and
“Amazon Mechanical Turk” with “We” and “Our” to retain anonymity.
46. Survey, supra note 6.
47. See infra Figure 4.
48. Survey, supra note 6.
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indicated that most participants were very uncertain but tilted toward
believing (mistakenly) that they had not entered into a binding arbitration
clause with Amazon Mechanical Turk (M = −7.98, SD = 56.03, 95% CI
[−14.05, −1.90]). Illustrative explanations included, “I do not know,” “I
don’t believe there is a binding arbitration clause with Amazon, but I signed
up with Mturk long enough ago that I don’t remember all the terms and
conditions,” “I feel that binding arbitration clauses are common with a lot of
companies,” and “Probably was in the fine print.”
III. IMPLICATIONS ON THE ETHICS
OF DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
This empirical legal study reveals that, when members of the public learn
how predispute binding arbitration clauses operate, they feel that the
arbitration process is unfair and unjust. Hence, the empirical study highlights
a situation in which zealous advocacy norms conflict with ethical ideals that
seek to mitigate harm to third parties and the public. Mainly, if transactional
attorneys zealously advance their client’s economic interest when crafting
predispute binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts, this may
degrade the rule of law, including rule-of-law norms and rule-of-law
culture,49 imperiling the long-term viability of our legal institutions. Given
the extant legal landscape in which the U.S. Supreme Court has delegated
broad discretion to firms to craft binding arbitration clauses in adhesion
contracts with little judicial oversight,50 psychological influences within law
firms and companies51 make it more likely that transactional attorneys will
serve as zealous advocates rather than virtuous agents who consider the longterm harm to the public caused by the degradation of legal institutions. Even
so, structural changes in the legal landscape may alter these dynamics and
make it more likely that the wider ethical ideal will flourish.
A. The Public Learns the Significance of Predispute
Binding Arbitration Clauses After Disputes Arise
The more the public learns about predispute binding arbitration clauses,
the more the public believes binding arbitration is unjust and illegitimate.
Yet most members of the public first learn how predispute binding arbitration
clauses affect them after their disputes arise, and especially after they consult
with legal professionals. Much like the New York Times reporting on binding
arbitration clauses, legal aid providers and plaintiffs’ lawyers will be the first

49. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL:
THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 16–43 (2015).

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF

50. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Resnik, supra note 2, at 2810, 2885–87; see also
DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015).
51. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1107, 1137 (2013).
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to explain that binding arbitration largely favors the drafters of adhesion
contracts and that there is very little ground for court review.52
This moment of interaction between laypeople and legal professionals is
fundamental to understanding how predispute binding arbitration clauses
degrade the rule of law and the legitimacy of public legal institutions. These
legal professionals must explain the actual meaning, significance, and effect
of binding consumer-arbitration clauses. For example, they will likely
explain that binding arbitration often favors industry as a repeat player and
seldom the one-shot player,53 that there is seldom any ground for judicial
review of an arbitrator’s decision,54 and that in many jurisdictions, an
arbitrator need not even explain his or her decision.55 Similarly, if the
member of the public is an employee who has a grievance against an
employer, these legal professionals will explain that employees win less often
and less money in arbitration than in litigation,56 that arbitration is not a
hospitable venue for unrepresented claimants,57 and that predispute binding
arbitration clauses, given the prevalence of class action waivers, essentially
eradicate class actions and group litigation.58
Finally, plaintiffs’ lawyers will explain that given the likelihood that the
claimant will not prevail and, hence, that these legal professionals will not be
compensated with contingency fees or prevailing statutory fee awards, the
aggrieved member of the public will likely be unable to secure legal
representation.59 If members of the public have claims that they cannot
reasonably present on their own pro se, then it is virtually certain that they
will fail to receive meaningful legal relief or access to justice. From this
52. Members of the public rarely know that a contract contains a predispute binding
arbitration clause. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 18–22 (“[O]ver threefourths stated that they did not know whether their card issuers used pre-dispute arbitration
clauses (78.8%).”). Hence, lawyers and legal aid providers are often the first to inform
claimants about the significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses.
53. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 96, 97–100 (1974); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note
10, at 57; Margaret Jane Radin, Access to Justice and Abuses of Contract, 33 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS TO JUST. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2735011 [https://perma.cc/9BGV-XAKW].
54. See Welsh, supra note 4, at 206–09.
55. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 397–98; see also Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and
Investor Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 809 (2015); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy
and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 301
(2004).
56. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 80 (2014); Sternlight, supra note 17, at 1312,
1322–25.
57. See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind
of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 78
(2014). Rules prohibit arbitrators from providing help to the parties. See UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT § 4 cmt. 4(c) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2000) (disallowing
the neutral to assist, despite explicitly recognizing the possibility that power imbalances may
exist between parties); Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1, 12 (2006).
58. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), with Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
59. See Sternlight, supra note 17, at 1334–40.
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angle, one observes a perspective in which predispute binding arbitration
clauses prevent the effectuation of rights, including important civil rights
enacted under federal law.60
B. Firms Are Incentivized to Use Predispute
Binding Arbitration Clauses to Reduce Litigation Exposure
From another angle, one can understand why predispute binding
arbitration clauses are attractive to firms, businesses, and multinational
companies.61 To begin, the Supreme Court has diffused and delegated
decision-making authority to firms, allowing them to craft binding arbitration
clauses and related dispute procedures with little judicial oversight.62
Professor Nancy Welsh has described this diffusion and delegation as a form
of institutional self-help, an opportunistic search for the funding and
personnel that courts need to conduct fact-finding and decision making in
cases that courts view as routine.63 Professor Margaret Radin has observed
that the Supreme Court’s decisions are predicated on theories of private
ordering and individual freedom.64
As profit-seeking actors, firms seek to maximize their economic selfinterest within the wide discretion afforded by the Supreme Court.65 By way
of analogy, it is within this extant legal structure that Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. famously elaborated that an actor will behave as a “bad man”
going as far as the law will permit him to go, irrespective of ethical
considerations or externalities that harm third parties or the public.66 For
60. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 2851 n.228.
61. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3 (Omri BenShahar ed., 2007); Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE:
THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, supra, at 200, 206; see also Randy E. Barnett,
Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).
62. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision steps beyond Concepcion and Italian Colors. There, as here, the Court
misread the FAA to deprive consumers of effective relief against powerful economic entities
that write no-class-action arbitration clauses into their form contracts.”); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to
pursue that remedy.” (emphasis added)).
63. See Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and
Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 162–163, 165; Welsh, supra
note 4, at 193–98.
64. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 19 (2012) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; Margaret Jane Radin, An
Analytical Framework for Legal Evaluation of Boilerplate, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT LAW 215 (G. Klass et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Radin, An Analytical
Framework].
65. Cf. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 26–27 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (4th ed. 1786) (“It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”).
66. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61
(1897).
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example, a firm may act in its own economic interest to reduce both
exposures to liability and aggregate annual litigation expenditures by crafting
adhesion contracts with predispute binding arbitration clauses. Existing legal
structures tolerate—indeed, perhaps encourage—adhesion contracts with
predispute binding arbitration clauses.67
Firms, therefore, harness the authority delegated to them under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to shield themselves as far as possible from liability.68
For example, many firms require consumers to enter into adhesion contracts
with binding arbitration clauses that ban class actions. The difficulty is that
when consumers have claims that are too small to rationally pursue on an
individual basis (i.e., the negative-expected-value-suit problem69), these
class action bans have the effect of negating liability for these harms.70
Moreover, some firms have crafted adhesion contracts that bar injunctive and
declaratory relief.71 Others employ adhesion contracts that require
consumers to travel to distant forums to arbitrate.72 Finally, scholars have
written about the incentives that these firms may have to capture arbitral
bodies and the extent to which the repeat-player effect and funding sources
may bias and influence arbitrators’ decision making.73
C. The Societal Effect Is a Tragedy of the Commons
That Degrades the Rule of Law and Civil Justice System
While each firm acts in its own independent economic self-interest, taken
together the cumulative effect of this conduct is a tragedy of the commons.74
67. See Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 9–11 (2011) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Senior Attorney, Public
Justice); Resnik, supra note 2, at 2870. We note that the term “firm” encompasses all
economic entities, including law firms. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002).
68. See Glover, supra note 1, at 3061–32.
69. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551–54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
70. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 13, at 888; Imre Stephen Szalai, Correcting a Flaw in
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 282.
71. See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms:
Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 470–
71, 472 n.12 (2015).
72. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 53–55; see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual
Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (2015).
73. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695,
697; Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?: The Case Against the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 273–74 (2008).
74. Cf. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 36. It bears noting that firms, executives,
and elite lawyers exhibited a high degree of coordination when devising a legal strategy to
broaden the liability shielding power of these predispute binding arbitration clauses with class
action waivers. See generally Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),
aff’d, 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015); Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 398–
99 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh & Stephan J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The
Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP.
RESOL. MAG. 18, 18–19 (2014).
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As the prevalence of these clauses rises and most transactions that consumers
enter contain predispute binding arbitration clauses, the legitimacy and
justness of our civil justice system and the rule of law erode. Increasingly,
firms conclude that it is in their independent economic interest to “defect”
from or opt out of public legal institutions by adopting predispute binding
arbitration clauses that subtly bias the results of this dispute procedure in their
favor.75 When wide swaths of the public learn that their grievances must be
arbitrated using a dispute-resolution procedure that favors the repeat player
and that there is no judicial review, trust in the courts and the rule of law
wanes, and the perceived legitimacy and justness of our civil justice system
degrades. Professor Radin refers to the effect of mass-market boilerplate
rights-deletion schemes as “democratic degradation.”76 In short, the
interaction of these conditions and clauses operates to diminish the
legitimacy and justness of our legal institutions.
D. Zealous Advocacy Is a Cause and Consequence
Transactional attorneys serve clients and draft adhesion contracts within
this legal landscape and, thus, face tension between the norm of zealous
advocacy and a wider virtuous ethic that seeks to limit harm to third parties
and takes responsibility for the quality of justice. A transactional attorney,
whether in-house or outside counsel, drafts adhesion contracts for clients who
seek to advance their economic interests, regardless of harm to public
institutions. Consent to adhesion contracts is illusory as the public neither
reads nor understands their terms. Therefore, transactional attorneys have
marked leeway and power to draft binding arbitration clauses within adhesion
contracts that members of the public will “accept.”77
A transactional attorney who serves as a zealous advocate will seek to
maximize his or her client’s economic interest with zeal. In this regard, the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state, “As advisor, a lawyer
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights
and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a
75. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 16–17; Glover, supra note 1, at
3074–76.
76. See RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 15–18, 33; Reuben, supra note 55, at 279,
309–18; cf. Tyler, supra note 5, at 375 (“Being legitimate is important to the success of
authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to exert influence
over others based solely upon the possession and use of power.”). This erosion to the
democratic backdrop complicates the theory that adjudication is purely a private good. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
77. Scholars have noted that the Supreme Court now treats binding arbitration clauses
more favorably than other clauses within adhesion contracts; for example, other clauses within
adhesion contracts are subject to a variety of contract-related defenses. See Peter B. Rutledge
& Christopher Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After
Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 974 (2014) (“[A] nonarbitral class
waiver . . . poses greater risks of court invalidation. After Concepcion, the FAA provides a
substantial degree of protection for arbitral class waivers; nonarbitral class waivers have no
such federal law backing.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: StoltNielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 323, 389–90 (2011).
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lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary
system.”78 From this perspective, the primary ethical principle governing
transactional lawyers is to advocate their client’s private interest with zeal,
rather than to weigh whether the public’s interest in a just, fair, and legitimate
civil justice system is inimical to their client’s interest.79 The principle of
zealous advocacy points these transactional attorneys toward taking their
clients as far as they can go within the broad delegation and discretion of
decision-making authority that the Supreme Court allows. Zealous advocacy
makes it likely that transactional lawyers will encourage their clients to opt
out of public legal institutions and into binding arbitration and to craft
predispute binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts that robustly
advance their client’s economic interests.80
In short, it is highly unlikely that those who zealously draft and design
adhesion contracts will consider the public’s perspective or enact dispute
resolution procedures that truly lead to neutral, unbiased, and just outcomes.
Instead, these zealous advocates will engage in zero-sum thinking and
maximize one side—their client’s interest—when crafting adhesion contracts
irrespective of degradation to civil justice and the rule of law. Zealous
advocacy impairs the legal infrastructure that supports private ordering and
comes at the expense of the public’s ability to rely on a just legal
infrastructure that the public demands in a vibrant democracy that abides by
the rule of law.81
E. A Wider, More Virtuous Ethical Ideal
Surely it is erroneous to conclude that these transactional attorneys must
act as zealous advocates when crafting binding arbitration clauses within
adhesion contracts. Does the ethical principle of zealous advocacy even
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); see also id. r. 1.3
cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”). The principle of zealous advocacy as
expressed within the professional rules has waxed and waned across time. For example, the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility previously stated, “The duty of a lawyer,
both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980). While
the ABA’s Ethical Considerations were not mandatory, they were aspirational and represented
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive and constituted a
body of principles upon which lawyers can rely for guidance in many specific situations. See
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 11 (1988) (discussing how wide
and narrow understandings of this principle have dueled across time); see also Carol Rice
Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical Perspective, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381, 427–35 (2012); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084–90 (1988).
79. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 49–80 (2003); Austin Sarat, The Profession Versus the Public Interest:
Reflections on Two Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (2002).
80. Cf. COLL. OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST
EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL,
ARBITRATORS & ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 1–3 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al. eds.,
2010), http://www.thecca.net/sites/default/files/CCA_Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C2DNPE4].
81. Cf. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 15–18, 33.
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apply to transactional attorneys who craft adhesion contracts?82 According
to Lon Fuller, the purpose of adversarialism is to ensure that, when legal
officials deliberate, they are presented with plural perspectives.83 That is,
adversarialism ensures that legal officials are adequately presented with each
party’s account so that these legal officials can take the perspective of all
sides before rendering a legal decision. The site in which transactional
attorneys labor, however, is far outside the courtroom or a context in which
work product is zealously prepared to present a narrative to an impartial
adjudicator. As Professor David Luban has concluded, it would be error to
enter a blanket claim of moral nonaccountability given how far we are from
the purpose of adversarial ethics.84
There are, however, wider and more virtuous ethical principles that apply
to transactional attorneys who create binding arbitration clauses within
adhesion contracts. Indeed, attorneys have an ethical responsibility to protect
the public’s interest in the quality of justice. For example, the preamble of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct state: “A lawyer, as a member of
the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.”85 Lawyers, moreover, serve a unique, indispensable role that
mediates between their client’s interest and the public’s interest.86 Alexis de

82. Commentators are divided on whether the principle of zealous advocacy applies to
lawyers beyond the litigation context. See Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1165, 1171 n.36, 1193 (2006); Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About
Professionalism: Core Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067,
1069–70 (2007). Leaving to one side the issue of whether transactional attorneys must act as
zealous advocates under the model rules, the principle of zealous advocacy is a powerful social
norm that influences the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of transactional attorneys. See Bruce
A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 359 n.144 (1998);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244–45 (1991). See
generally Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (1998). Socialization in the legal profession
may transmit this social norm. See Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 5–7 (2009) (“From the beginning of law school, a lawyer is
idealized as a zealous advocate for her client’s objective.”). Finally, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, when contrasted with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
narrow the obligation to represent clients with zeal. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that
might be realized for a client.”).
83. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1961).
84. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 5, at 851; see also DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 62–64 (2007); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary
System in a Postmodern Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 38–40 (1996).
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY pmbl.; CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1908).
86. See Simon, supra note 78, at 1113–19. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, The
Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2011); David Luban, The Noblesse
Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988).
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Tocqueville elaborated this wider ethic,87 Talcott Parsons expounded on it,88
and Louis Brandeis also advanced this more virtuous principle.89 This ethical
principle would require lawyers not to engage in actions that erode the
legitimacy of the civil justice system or public institutions. Finally, drawing
on Aristotelian virtue ethics, the role of an attorney should be imbued with
an ethical responsibility that goes beyond maximizing their client’s selfinterest—attorneys have an ethical role and responsibility to protect the
interest of the public as well.90 In sum, under this wider and more virtuous
ethical ideal, transactional attorneys behave unethically when crafting
adhesion contracts that erode our civil justice system and the legitimacy of
legal institutions.
Doubtless, there is tension between the ethical principle of zealous
advocacy and this wider ethical ideal. On the one hand, zealous advocacy
advances the economic interests of a client and may result in adhesion
contracts with manifestly unjust clauses. On the other hand, a wider and more
virtuous ethical ideal would have transactional attorneys protect the public’s
interest in the rule of law and the viability of just legal institutions when
engaging in dispute-system design.91
F. Implications of Behavioral Legal Ethics
and Social Psychological Research
Even so, we should not conclude that transactional lawyers who do not
abide by this wider and more virtuous ethical principle are unethical people.
Decades of social psychological research underscore that situational
influences and roles within environments powerfully shape the way people
87. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267–70 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., HarperPerennial 1988) (1835) (discussing the role that lawyers play
in public life and preserving democratic institutions); see also Phil C. Neal, De Tocqueville
and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 607 (1967).
88. See TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370, 370–71 (rev. ed. 1954) (elaborating the role of lawyers as serving
both clients and the public interest, a role that maintains stability and dynamism in democratic
society); TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra, at 34, 38.
89. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 325
(1925) (discussing the role of lawyers in protecting public interest); see also Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 351, 354–
56 (2013).
90. See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a
Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J.L. PROF. 5, 29 (1996); see also
ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE (E.V. Riece ed., J.A.K. Thompson trans., Penguin
Books 1955) (n.d.). From this perspective, an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics is in marked
tension with an account that would permit an amoral role morality for legal professionals. See
W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 161 (1995).
91. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5; cf. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering
Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1603–04 (2002); Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the
Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1680–82 (2002); Thomas D. Morgan,
Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1793, 1796–97 (2002).
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think, feel, and behave. Professors Jennifer Robbennolt, Jean Sternlight,
Andrew Perlman, and others have elaborated an approach known as
behavioral legal ethics, which weaves together social psychology and legal
ethics to better understand the experiences of lawyers within firm cultures
and the way they make meaning within their environments.92 Importantly,
social psychological research on the fundamental attribution error (also
referred to as the correspondence bias) reveals that we overestimate the
extent to which people’s actions, especially their apparently virtuous or
unethical actions, reflect the kind of people that they are and that we
underestimate the extent to which their conduct is the product of situational
influences.93 Regarding such situational influences, Kurt Lewin developed
the “field theory,” which explores the causes and conditions that influence
people within a given situation.94 According to Lewin, a “field” refers to the
psychological context that individuals experience in a particular point in
time.95 Lewin identified two opposing forces present in any given field:
“channels” that drive people toward a goal96 and “barriers” that inhibit
movement toward that goal.97
Transactional lawyers, both in-house and within law firms, encounter a
context in which clients seek to maximize their economic interest in all of
their transactions, including when creating adhesion contracts. In the
parlance of Lewin’s field theory, there are many “channel factors” that make
it much more likely that these lawyers will serve as zealous advocates rather
than rise to a wider and more virtuous ethical principle. For example, a
salient norm in these environments is the norm of serving a client’s economic
interest.98 Far less salient is the ethic of contemplating and avoiding various
courses of actions that harm the public’s long-term interest in the quality of
justice. Moreover, social psychological research reveals that face-to-face
encounters with clients (and senior partners) increase the likelihood that
midlevel transactional lawyers will zealously advance client interests when
92. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J.
1639 (2015); Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be
Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2015); Nancy B. Rapoport,
“Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior
in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42 (2014); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Behavioral Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 75 (2015);
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 51, at 1107–09.
93. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM
BRAINS TO CULTURE (2013); DANIEL T. GILBERT, SPEEDING WITH NED: A PERSONAL VIEW OF
THE CORRESPONDENCE BIAS (1998); RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
94. See KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951); see also THOMAS
GILOVICH & LEE ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY’S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHT 42–70 (2015).
95. LEWIN, supra note 94, at 48–53.
96. Id. at 174.
97. Id. at 40.
98. See Cramton, supra note 91, at 1603; Dolovich, supra note 91, at 1682; Morgan, supra
note 91, at 1797; see also Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 437 (2008); Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 670–72 (2002).
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crafting dispute-resolution clauses within adhesion contracts.99 Further,
research on the foot-in-the-door technique suggests that these lawyers will
likely behave as zealous advocates of their clients’ interests when drafting
predispute binding arbitration clauses given the many other transactions in
which these lawyers already seek to advance their client’s economic
interests.100
Finally, research on cognitive dissonance suggests that lawyers may
reappraise their conduct as reasonable and normative.101 For example, social
psychological research reveals that our past behavior influences the way we
feel and think about that behavior.102 Indeed, a consistent finding in the
behavioral science literature is that people’s behavior is often more predictive
of their attitudes than their attitudes are of their behavior.103 Rather than
believing that they are behaving unethically, these transactional lawyers will
likely reappraise their past actions as rational, necessary, and just. For
example, they may rationalize predispute binding arbitration as faster,
cheaper, and better.104 Or perhaps they may reappraise their conduct as
normative, believing it would harm their client’s interests not to employ these
clauses with terms that reduce their client’s liability exposure, especially
when many other companies are engaging in the same practice.
99. See GILOVICH & ROSS, supra note 94, at 45–46; see also ROBERT L. NELSON,
PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 282 (1988)
(“[A]lthough large-firm lawyers embrace the ideology of professional autonomy in the
abstract, when it comes to questions of legal policy that pertain to their practice they strongly
identify with their clients’ positions and interests. . . . [T]he reported incidence of
disagreements between lawyers and clients is extremely rare, never occurring in the careers of
three or four lawyers in my four-firm sample.”); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience
by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007)
(“[L]awyers frequently find themselves in the kinds of contexts that produce high levels of
conformity and obedience and low levels of resistance to illegal or unethical instructions. The
result is that subordinate lawyers . . . will find it difficult to resist a superior’s commands in
circumstances that should produce forceful dissent.”).
100. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 47 (2009). See generally Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without
Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 195
(1966).
101. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 33 (Stanford Univ. Press
1962) (1957); Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE THEORY: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 (Eddie
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1998).
102. See Paula M. Niedenthal et al., Embodiment in Attitudes, Social Perception, and
Emotion, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 184, 189 (2005); Pitor Winkielman et al., The
Embodied Emotional Mind, in EMBODIED GROUNDING: SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND
NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES 263, 263 (Gün R. Samin & Eliot R. Smith eds., 2008).
103. See generally Laura R. Glasman & Dolores Albarracin, Forming Attitudes That
Predict Future Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the Attitude-Behavior Relation, 132 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 778 (2006).
104. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Releases Poll Showing Arbitration Faster, Simpler and Less
Costly Than Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Apr. 13, 2005), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-releases-poll-showing-arbitrationfaster-simpler-and-less-costly-than-litigation [https://perma.cc/UHU6-UVKC]; cf. Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility
for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 78, 101–10 (1993) (discussing the rationalization
that ensues after lawyers engage in conduct that harms the public).
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There are certainly barriers to a wider ethic as well. For example, the ethic
that considers the long-term public interest is not salient within these
environments. Moreover, there are no clear exit options out of this ethical
dilemma. Transactional lawyers who wishes to rise to a higher ethical ideal
must opt out of the default norm of zealously advancing their client’s
economic interest, perhaps by confronting their client, which may well
imperil their livelihood.105 The interaction of these channels and barriers
underscores that it is much more likely for transactional attorneys to
reappraise their conduct as reasonable and just and to draft predispute binding
arbitration clauses that zealously advance their client’s interests.
G. Changing Default Rules and Allowing
the Wider Ethical Principle to Flourish
When taken together, the wider ethical principle is frustrated by the
interaction of the broad delegation of authority to firms that harness
predispute binding arbitration clauses with little oversight, the incentive to
maximize a client’s own economic interest, and the situational influences that
transactional lawyers encounter within their working environments. As a
practical matter, the interaction of these powerful causes and conditions
endanger the wider ethical ideal. Urging transactional lawyers to rise to a
wider, more virtuous ethic will have little effect on the status quo.106
Yet the wider ethical principle may flourish if the default rules that broadly
defer and delegate authority to firms are restructured. For example, greater
regulatory or judicial oversight of predispute binding arbitration clauses will
alter the behavior of firms and, by implication, the transactional lawyers who
draft these clauses on behalf of their clients.107 Professor Radin has argued
that greater oversight and regulation are justified based on the theory that
firms should be allowed to maximize their own profit, but within limits.108
Mainly, firms should not be permitted to erode the background legal
conditions that make private ordering possible. Instead, regulatory and
judicial oversight should allow these firms to act in their self-interest, so long
as they do not erode or degrade the commons of a viable, legitimate, and just

105. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 47 (2007) (“[A]fter
lawyers have offered their ‘quiet counsel,’ they will still have to press forward with the
representation if the client won’t be dissuaded. Perhaps the lawyer can say that she gave
morality the old college try, and her heart is pure. Our worry, however, was not about impure
hearts, but about dirty hands.”); cf. GILOVICH & ROSS, note 94, at 60 (“Even if participants
decided that they wanted to get off the path they were on, it wasn’t at all clear how to do so.
There was no clear exit out of the (traumatic) situation in which they found themselves.”).
106. See Kath Hall, Why Good Intentions Are Often Not Enough: The Potential for Ethical
Blindness in Legal Decision-Making, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND
NEW IDEAS 210, 210 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2012); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of
Lawyers’ Justice in America, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1860–62 (2002).
107. Cf. Client Alert: CFPB Attacks Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses, VORYS (Mar. 16,
2015), http://www.vorys.com/publications-1459.html [https://perma.cc/NH7Q-3PZB]. Note
that even the title of the article “alerts” clients to the possible regulation on the horizon, putting
them on notice of the change in trade winds. See id.
108. See Radin, An Analytical Framework, supra note 64, at 220–21.
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civil justice system.109 Moreover, while our legal culture imbues predispute
binding arbitration clauses with legal meaning, symbolism, and qualities such
as choice, consent, volition, and a sense of being bargained for, we should
recall that from an ecological perspective, members of the public neither
read, appreciate, understand, nor consider these clauses when coping with the
actual demands of daily life. Professor Arthur Leff noted several decades
ago, “[S]uch clauses are things, the products of non-bargaining, similar to
‘unilaterally manufactured commodities.’”110 Regulators and courts,
therefore, have an important role to play in monitoring this boundary when
deciding the permissibility of various forms of dispute-system design within
adhesion contracts that force the public out of the formal civil justice system
and that may impair our public legal institutions.111
There are many other models of oversight across the globe that offer
comparative guidance. Indeed, the United States is one of the few Western
liberal democracies where there are relatively few limitations upon the
arbitrability of consumer disputes.112 Within the European Union, member
states review clauses for fairness, and Sweden declares these clauses
invalid.113 The United Kingdom and Germany impose other important
limitations.114
109. See id. at 236–37; cf. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist
Proposals for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 712 (2016) (rejecting overbroad
enforcement, while preserving the general enforcement of arbitration agreements under
contract law’s standards of consent).
110. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970); see also
Resnik, supra note 2, at 2870.
111. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 250–51 (2004). Depending on
how this form of regulation is designed, this legal landscape may have the effect of positive
liberty, promoting bona fide consent, individual autonomy, and human flourishing. See Hiro
N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?, 91
IND. L.J. 1143, 1148–53 (2016). Scholars have encouraged different forms and standards of
judicial review. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Maureen A. Weston, The
Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010).
112. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 478 (2015) (“The Court’s ever-larger
expansion of the FAA’s scope contrasts sharply with how other countries treat mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion.”). In the United States, there are several
areas in which predispute binding arbitration clauses are curtailed. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
§ 1026.36 (2016) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in loan documents for mortgage
and home equity loans); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for LongTerm Care Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688, 68797 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.70(n)) (“[W]e are prohibiting the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements.”);
cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012); Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 100 (May 24, 2016)
(“[P]roposing regulations governing agreements that provide for the arbitration of any future
disputes between consumers and providers of certain consumer financial products and
services.”).
113. See, e.g., LAG OM SKILJEFÖRFARANDE (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1999:116)
(Swed.) (The Swedish Arbitration Act).
114. See generally ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPL] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 1025–
1066,
translation
at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_
zpo.html#p3524 (Ger.) (German Arbitration Act) [https://perma.cc/2GKD-9L92]; Practice
Guideline No. 17, Guidelines for Arbitrators Dealing with Cases Involving Consumers and
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By changing the regulatory environment, the incentives of firms and
transactional attorneys would better align with the wider ethical ideal. For
example, predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts could
be deemed legally unenforceable.115 Instead, if firms wish to engage in
binding arbitration with consumers and employees, these firms could be
limited to using binding arbitration agreements that are entered into
separately from the primary contract, after a dispute has arisen. Indeed, New
Zealand harnesses this model of regulatory oversight.116
In this example, binding arbitration agreements would be enforceable only
if they are entered into after a dispute has arisen and with the bona fide
consent of both parties. This change would make it more likely that a wider
ethical standard would flourish and less likely that zealous advocacy would
endanger this wider ethic. As our empirical legal study suggests, members
of the public learn about the meaning and significance of different disputeresolution procedures only after disputes arise. Therefore, members of the
public would consent to these clauses only if they perceived a benefit in doing
so. For example, members of the public would enter into these agreements
if they believed that binding arbitration reduces cost and delay and that
binding arbitration is truly as fair, just, neutral, and trustworthy as a formal
legal proceeding.117 When making this assessment, many members of the

Parties
with
Significant
Differences
of
Resources,
CIARB
(2011),
http://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/ciarbdocuments/international-arbitrationguidelines-2011/2011significantdifferencesofresources.pdf?sfvrsn=6 (last visited Mar. 25,
2017) (“In the UK, clauses are presumed unfair (and therefore unenforceable against a
consumer) in low value claims, currently below £5,000; . . . and in Germany, a consumer
arbitration agreement will only be enforceable if separately agreed to by the consumer (either
by being contained in a separate, signed document or in a fully notarised contract.)”)
[https://perma.cc/Q4A4-5YQ2].
115. See Therese Wilson, Setting Boundaries Rather Than Imposing Bans: Is It Possible
to Regulate Consumer Arbitration Clauses to Achieve Fairness to Consumers?, 39 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 349, 354–55 (2016) (arguing that predispute arbitration clauses should be
unenforceable). For an example of an area in which such clauses are unenforceable, see
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities,
81 Fed. Reg. at 68,797 (“[W]e are prohibiting the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements.”). Other plausible alternatives bearing familial resemblance include permitting a
member of the public to opt out of a mandatory predispute arbitration clause or requiring that
a member of the public affirm their willingness to comply with a mandatory predispute
arbitration clause if a dispute arises.
116. See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996, s 11 (N.Z.).
117. Laudably, due process protocols have been developed to improve the fairness of
arbitration. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1998), https://adr.org/
aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc/2BPE-ZTZV]. If arbitration offers
comparable fairness and outcome justice with the advantages of cost and delay reductions,
then consumers will most likely agree to arbitration after disputes arise. Hence, these
protocols will have an even greater influence on consumer decision making after disputes
arise. Further, in this scenario, independent third-party assessments, such as an arbitration
fairness index, would increase in importance. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer
and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985
(2012).
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public would likely consult with legal professionals about the significance of
these postdispute binding arbitration clauses.
This altered legal landscape would create a social-psychological channel
that would make it more likely for a wider ethical ideal to flourish. The
lawyers who draft these postdispute binding arbitration clauses would need
to empathize with and take the perspective of third parties while at the same
time advancing their clients’ interests.
This perspective taking is incredibly important in allowing the wider, more
virtuous ethical ideal to flourish. Of note, especially given the dialectic of
the two ethical principles that animates our discussion, when transactional
attorneys anticipate that plaintiffs’ lawyers will zealously guide members of
the public into appropriate and fair dispute-resolution procedures, they will
be far more likely to embrace a wider ethical ideal that considers the public’s
concerns. The ethic of zealous advocacy, therefore, plays a role in the social
psychological dynamic that shifts defense-side interests to embrace a wider
ethical ideal. Stated differently, if transactional attorneys anticipate that
plaintiffs’ lawyers will serve as zealous advocates who will direct clients to
less expensive, less time-consuming procedures only if these procedures are
equally just and fair, then defendants’ lawyers who craft these postdispute
agreements will have a wider concern for creating just and fair dispute
procedures. Indeed, the success of these postdispute agreements would in
large part be based upon the ability to engage in perspective taking. Further,
this legal landscape would create powerful social psychological barriers that
would make it far less likely for a one-sided adversarial ethic to prevail.
Again, postdispute binding arbitration agreements would require both sides
to provide true consent. As a result, transactional lawyers who draft and
design these clauses would craft them so that the parties receive a mutual
benefit sufficient to choose postdispute binding arbitration.
This wider, more virtuous ethical perspective is crucial to prevent
democratic degradation and the tragedy of the commons that endangers and
threatens the vitality of our legal institutions. Enhancing judicial and
regulatory oversight of predispute binding arbitration clauses will both
reduce the channel factors that incentivize transactional attorneys to
zealously craft binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts, while at
the same time diminishing the social psychological barriers that endanger the
more virtuous, ethical ideal. Ensuring the quality of justice is a collective
and fragile endeavor, one demanding that transactional attorneys who craft
and design adhesion contracts balance both the interests of their client with
the needs and perspective of the public. This synthesis will sustain and
protect the fairness, legitimacy, and justice of our civil justice system in this
era of vanishing trials.
APPENDIX
The following pages contain the three statistical tables referenced
throughout this Article.

n = 90
M (SD)

95% CI
[3.33, 4.15]
[2.88, 3.66]
[4.62, 5.38]
[2.63, 3.43]
[3.10, 3.84]
[3.13, 4.05]
[3.18, 4.01]
[2.21, 2.96]
[2.23, 2.98]
[2.90, 3.54]

n = 66
M (SD)
3.74 (1.67)a
3.27 (1.58)a
5.00 (1.54)b
3.03 (1.62)a
3.47 (1.52)a
3.59 (1.86)a
3.59 (1.69)a
2.58 (1.53)a
2.61 (1.53)a
3.21 (1.29)a

Dependent Measure

Familiarity

Fairness

Unfairness

Justness

Accuracy

Effectiveness

Legitimacy

Feelings

Favorability

Experiences of Justice

[3.95, 4.46]

[3.66, 4.34]

[3.62, 4.24]

[4.36, 5.06]

[3.95, 4.59]

[3.74, 4.31]

[3.82, 4.42]

[3.29, 3.94]

[3.70, 4.27]

[2.97, 3.68]

95% CI

4.99 (1.16)c

4.78 (1.35)c

4.74 (1.42)c

5.51 (1.49)c

5.26 (1.29)c

4.69 (1.29)c

4.92 (1.45)c

3.21 (1.64)a

5.00 (1.37)c

3.65 (1.89)a

M (SD)

n = 91

Definition

[4.75, 5.23]

[4.50, 5.06]

[4.44, 5.03]

[5.19, 5.82]

[5.00, 5.53]

[4.42, 4.96]

[4.62, 5.22]

[2.87, 3.55]

[4.72, 5.28]

[3.26, 4.04]

95% CI

4.61 (1.27)b, c

4.35 (1.67)b, c

4.26 (1.62)b, c

5.02 (1.58)b, c

4.49 (1.36)c

4.35 (1.26)b, c

4.43 (1.49)b, c

3.34 (1.45)a

4.57 (1.43)c

3.63 (1.67)a

M (SD)

n = 82

Sample Clause

[4.33, 4.88]

[3.99, 4.72]

[3.90, 4.62]

[4.68, 5.37]

[4.64, 5.24]

[4.08, 4.63]

[4.10, 4.75]

[3.02, 3.67]

[4.26, 4.89]

[3.27, 4.00]

95% CI
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Note: Means on the same row with unlike subscripts different at alpha = .05 according to the Tukey HSD procedure.

4.20 (1.20)b

4.00 (1.61)b

3.93 (1.47)b

4.71 (1.66)b

4.27 (1.54)b

4.02 (1.38)b

4.12 (1.44)b

3.61 (1.55)a

3.99 (1.36)b

3.32 (1.70)a

No Information

News Article

Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% CI
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0.15
0.15

F(3, 325) = 18.62, p < .000
F(3, 325) = 19.05, p < .000

Effectiveness

Legitimacy

[-1.79, -0.45]

[-1.31, -0.05]

[-1.12, 0.02]

[-1.72, -0.47]

[0.74, 2.04]

[-1.31, -0.12]

p < .000

p = .030

p = .060

p < .000

p < .000

p = .011

[-2.58, -1.25]

[-2.30, -1.04]

[-1.79, -0.66]

[-2.52, -1.27]

[1.14, 2.44]

[-2.32, -1.13]

Difference,
95% CI

p-value

Difference,
95% CI

p < .000

p < .000

p < .000

p < .000

p < .000

p < .000

p-value

[-2.12, -0.75]

[-1.99, -0.71]

[-1.46, -0.30]

[-2.03, -0.76]

[0.99, 2.32]

[-1.91, -0.69]

Difference,
95% CI

C4 vs. C3

p < .000

p < .000

p = .001

p < .000

p < .000

p < .000

p-value

Note: Contrasts were conducted using Tukey tests. C1 indicates no-information condition, C2 indicates definition condition, C3 indicates sample clause condition,
and C4 indicates New York Times article condition.

0.17
0.09

F(3, 325) = 21.34, p < .000
F(3, 325) = 11.20, p < .000

0.16

F(3, 325) = 19.87, p < .000

Unfairness

Justness

0.16

F(3, 325) = 21.07, p < .000

Fairness

Accuracy

ηp2

Omnibus F-statistic

Dependent Measure

C4 vs. C2

C4 vs. C1

Omnibus F-statistic, effect size, contrasts between New York Times condition and other conditions

Table 2: Statistical Reporting of Justice and Legitimacy Items
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.630**
.541**
.446**
.544**
.626**

.854**
.738**
.665**
.716**
.797**

3. Justness

4. Accuracy

5. Effectiveness

6. Legitimacy

7. Feelings

Note: ** p < .01

-

.658**

-

1. Fairness

2

2. Unfairness (rx)

1

Measure

.771**

.757**

.692**

.769**

-

3

.682**

.678**

.622**

-

4

.632**

.679**

-

5

-

6

.704**

Table 3: Bivariate Correlations Between Items Forming Anticipated Experience of Justice

-
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